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Professor Michele Benedetto Neitz - "Shades ofEnron: the Legal
Ethics Implications of the General Motors Scandal"
[This is a guest post by Michele Benedetto Neitz on
one ofthe more important topics of the year: the role
oflawyers in the GM matter. JJS]
Here we go again. "Where were the Lawyers?" is
becoming a predicable refrain in response to any
wide-ranging corporate scandal. General Motors is
battling a rising deluge oflawsuits, investigations, and
government fines in the wake of its February 2014 recall of millions of cars for a safety
defect. The defect, a faulty ignition switch, is allegedly responsible for 13 fatalities and
hundreds of injuries.
The sorrow ofthe tragic loss oflife in this case is now joined by growing public anger
about a cover-up at the company to avoid liability for the defect. GM's engineers and
managers may have known of the problem as early as 2004, and OM's in-house lawyers
apparently knew about the defect in 2013 or earlier. The facts are still developing in
this story, and the release of an internal investigation report last week directed by
Anton Valukas answered significant questions. The actions of OM's lawyers clearly
raise significant legal ethics ramifications.
The Michigan State Bar, legal ethicists, and in-house counsel should take note of
potential violations ofthe following rules.
t.

Perjury

OM is defending multiple high-profile lawsuits related to the defect. One Georgia case,
brought by the family of crash victim Brooke Melton, included depositions of OM
engineers to identify the precise nature of the defective switch. During his deposition
testimony in the Melton case, OM engineer Raymond DeOiorgio testified that he had
never approved any modifications to the design switch. Documents later revealed that
Mr. DeGiorgio had in fact personally signed off on the changes to the switch in 2006.
OM's lawyers, from the law firm King & Spaulding, may or may not have known about
Mr. DeGiorgio's apparently perjurious testimony during the deposition. The Valukas
internal investigation revealed that soon after the deposition, the K&S lawyers told OM
"This case needs to be settled." If they did know about perjurious testimony, Georgia
Rule 3.3 (a)(3), like the ABA and Michigan Rules, would have required them to refuse to
offer the testimony. After the deposition, lawyers who learned that the testimony was
false should have followed remedial measures, including reporting the testimony to the
court if necessary. Although the Melton family's case was settled one day before a GM
executive was scheduled to testify, the Melton family's lawyer is now petitioning to
reopen the case in light ofMr. DeGiorgio's perjurious testimony.

2.

Reporting up the Ladder and Confidentiality

When did the lawyers know about the defect? The answer is still unclear, with observers
noting that GM's lawyers have had a pattern of settling cases related to the defect
before GM executives could be deposed. An amended class action complaint filed on
Wednesday argued that it is "inconceivable" that GM's lawyers did not know about the
defect before the company's 2009 bankruptcy. The Valukas internal investigation
report disclosed that outside counsel warned GM in July 2013 that a "compelling" case
could be made for knowledge of the defect as early as 2005, but "no GM lawyer
ap.prised the General Counsel." CEO Mary Barra stated that she did not know about the
defect on Chevrolet, Pontiac and Saturn vehicles until January 20, 2014, and the board
learned immediately after she did. GM was fined $35 million in May for failing to
comply with a federal law requiring automakers to report any safety defect within five
days.
GM lawyers' apparent knowledge about the defect, which was directly responsible for
fatal injuries, triggered at least two ethical rules. First, any corporate counsel with
knowledge of a violation oflaw that would harm the lawyers' organization must report
up the ladder under Michigan Rule 1.13 If a GM lawyer reported this to GC Michael
Milliken, and his response was inadequate, the lawyer should have gone to the CEO and
ultimately (if necessary) the board of directors. If there was still no progress, Rule 1.13
would have permitted GM's lawyers to report the defect outside of the company.
An exception to the general attorney-client confidentiality rule also applies here.
Under Michigan Rule 1.6(b)(3), GM's lawyers could have revealed confidences and
secrets to the extent reasonably necessary to rectify the consequences ofGM's illegal
actions in the furtherance of which the lawyer's services have been used. Indeed, the
outcome of the GM scandal is the type of result this exception was arguably designed to
prevent. Even in California, where the only exception to confidentiality is the
prevention of a criminal act likely to cause death or substantial bodily harm, the GM
lawyers would have been permitted to break confidentiality and reveal information
that might have saved lives.
Congress, are you listening? Since GM is a public company, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
would also apply. Under SOX, lawyers should have gone up the chain of command and
would have been allowed to report outside the company. We can expect the GM case
to serve as a useful case study the next time Congress considers mandating outside
reporting under SOX.

3· Conflict oflnterest
As the cover-up scandal reached a crescendo, GM hired Anton Valukas to co-direct an
internal investigation with GM Michael Milliken. Valukas is chairman of Jenner &
Block, a firm serving as current outside counsel for GM. Lawyers from King &
Spaulding, a firm that has represented GM in cases since the 1970s, assisted with the
investigation.
GM released the detailed report last week, and its stark assessment ofGM's failures
caused numerous GM employees to be fired. Even so, the existing relationship
between the firms and GM raised questions about whether this internal investigation
was credibly independent. As Professor Monroe Freedman noted, "A reasonable
person might question whether the firm wants to curry favor with GM, so it can
maintain a good relationship or obtain future work." The report cleared the top
officers, including the CEO and General Counsel, of any wrongdoing. Senator Richard
Blumenthal called the report "the best money can buy," noting that it "absolves upper
management, denies deliberate wrongdoing, and dismisses corporate responsibility."
Whether an actual conflict exists, the appearance of a conflict is overwhelming and
caused more bad press for General Motors.
The parallels to the Enron case are obvious: Corporate officials are lying about the
company's actions. In-house attorneys are staying mute about corporate wrongdoing.
A law firm with a potential conflict of interest is conducting an internal investigation.
With these resemblances, General Motors' shareholders should hope the end result is
not an Enron-style collapse. At least the Michigan Bar examiners will have an easy PR
fact pattern for July's bar exam.
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